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1.
The case in point is the Victor Yushchenko’s
election campaign, which lasted during several years
and ended with the victory of democracy and orange
revolution in Ukraine. This campaign is considered
by the American Association of political
technologist as the best in the world. I shall try
to tell you about some stages of the work performed
and some secrets of political technologies which has
been applied in Ukraine inaction. I worked at the
Department of Strategic Control, I was involved into
the campaign in 2001 and we finished this campaign
in 2004.
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2.
Victor Yushchenko was Prime – Minister in
2000-2001 and initiated a great deal of positive
changes in Ukraine. Then in 2002 he was at the head
of opposition and political block “Nasha Ukraina”
(Our Ukraine). This political force won the
elections in 2002 and in 2004 he became a candidate
to President of Ukraine. |
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3.
Rating of Victor Yushchenko as a leader of
the opposition did not fall during four years, all
that time it was high, to a considerable degree due
to political technologies and his own activity.
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4.
In 2002 at the elections to the Parliament of
Ukraine we had several political forces. There were
six of them and the were arranged along two axes,
left and right, the power and opposition,
respectively. ”Nasha Ukraina” (Our Ukraine) being
the Victor Yushchenko’s block was located in the
right section – from supporters of the power to the
opposition.
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5.
I believe that the best key message in the
period of political campaigns in Ukraine was
designed in 2002 during the election campaign. That
key message had the shape of an egg and consisted of
several layers. Victor Yushchenko was in the center.
The second layer included: “Victor Yushchenko had
never obtained any coin of credit from West and
Russia and paid off arrears of wages and pensions”.
This text was included into all the video clips of
Victor Yushchenko. Then the next layer – different
arguments. They were included into all the agitation
materials and in that way we tried to protect our
key message from censorship and discredit. The
slogan “Not in word but in deed!”
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6.
That time we did not use any TV channel so we
decided to communicate with big boards all over the
country. It was very impressive. And only by the end
of the election campaign those big boards, huge
constructions were sawn by bandits shielded by the
power.
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7.
In 2002 the only remedy we could influence
the voters without our own mass media was the
pre-election round. We performed very interactive
scene with the multimedia projector and were able to
install it in half an hour in spite of all obstacles
it means that when we arrived to a city and tiles in
a square were destroyed, we came to another city – a
regional center – and at that very place a zoo was
located, we arrived to the third regional center and
in the room where we had to meet voters all the
chairs were taken away, in the other room they cut
electricity. So we had a very difficult campaign,
but the power made a lot of mistakes and they became
known to people. People laughed may be like you do
now and understood that they were afraid of
Yushchenko like the leader of opposition.
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8.
There were a lot of myths disseminated about
Yushchenko and one of the myth was that Yushchenko
was weak and shilly-shally. In order to clear up
that myth we arranged all the Yushchenko’s
appearances in the following way – a special reading
– stand and special visual banners. In that case a
man standing at such reading stand could not be
weak. Even one second of such image broadcasting by
TV scattered the myth from a great deal of those who
hesitated.
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9.
Large negative campaign aimed on discredit of
Victor Yushchenko was held practically till the end
of 2004. Some channels has rejected censorship and
this campaign of discredit, but there were a lot of
different materials.
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10.
200 bigboards with fascist symbols were in
Donetsk. “Hedgehogs” were scattered on the road we
drove not to allow us to arrive to the city.
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11.
The results of the elections in 2002. We won
the campaign according to the political lists (our
system is a majority and political one – 50/50).
Ukraine separated practically into two halves – one
half supported Yushchenko. You see – Ivano-Frakovsk
region where 74% of residents supported V.
Yushchenko and Donetsk region with 2,7% of his
supporters, sufficient difference. Actually there
were two Ukraines where we had to work.
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12.
Actually the second campaign in 2004 started
without a break.
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13.
In positioning we were subdivided into lefts
and rights in 2002, we had some axes, but in the
latter case the positioning scheme was as follows:
the voters in fact into three different groups
approximately equal – democrat Yushchenko, from the
power – Yanukovitch and communist Symonenko. There
was a candidate – socialist Moroz who could join any
candidate in this campaign. That one who could
attract Moroz to his devotees would have the real
chance to win. Yushchenko managed to attract Moroz.
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14.
There were three key messages in the campaign
in 2004 and they coincided with the stages of the
campaign. “Yes! Yushchenko!” “I believe. I know. We
can!” and “Be well!”
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15.
The structure of the key message was not like
an egg with several layers this time but it had a
shape of a pyramid. The base word was “Believe”
because Victor Yushchenko was the only candidate
with high morality and people really trust in him.
It was a ground. The second part included arguments.
That was the whole campaign in 2002 – “I know”,
because he was a Prime-Minister, a head of the
National Bank. He knew how to rule over the country
and he knew what to do. The last, the top of the
pyramid with so solid base was “We can!” which later
turned into “orange revolution.
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16.
In 2003 we designed the orange campaign and
tried to install our bigboards all over the country.
The power keeping in mid their successful effect
destroyed them. All in all those bigboards existed
in all the regions only three days. They were either
destroyed or sawn down and instead the white – blue
bigboards of our opponent Yanukovitch were installed
all over the country.
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17.
In October 2003 we launched the action on
collection of signatures supporting Yushchenko.
First, to introduce an orange color, to spread this
symbolism in all regions, to mobilize our voters, to
enlarge our database. There were tents with flags
and orange clothes.
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18.
During this campaign we possessed such mass
media – one TV channel, a couple of newspapers and
several Internet sites.
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19.
We determined some strategic macroregions
depending on Yushchenko’s support. Green color –
those who really supported us and red one – those
who opposed. In fact we fought for Central Ukraine.
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20.
Taking into account that approximately half
residents in Ukraine supported Yushchenko, we
offered different messages for Eastern and Western
Ukraine. In Western Ukraine we spread the message “I
believe! I know! We can!” in Ukrainian language. For
Eastern Ukraine we issued the same leaflet in
Russian. As far as there were four negative
mysteries about Yushchenko in the leaflet we
annihilated them by the arguments of the truth. For
example the myth said that Yushchenko was going to
ban Russian language. We replied that President
Kuchma won two election campaigns manipulating with
the topic of Russian language, and so on.
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21.
At the very day of Yushchenko’s registration
as a presidential contender we held a meeting in
Spivoche Pole in Kiev for about 500 thousand people.
One representative of each city with an orange
symbolism. That picture we introduced in each clip
during two months. It was rehearsal before Maidan.
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22.
It is necessary to note that in our election
campaign we had a “Russian factor”, beginning with
the political technologists working with our
opponents and finishing with President Putin who
several times visited Ukraine and demonstrated his
support to Yanukovitch.
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23.
Imagine that you were Putin who was proposed
such kind of inquiry : “Can you agree to make
Russian language the second official language in the
State?” 61% said :”Yes”. 16% said: “No”. Everybody
knew this but nobody gambled on this. Everybody
understood that during the Soviet Power Ukrainian
language and Ukrainian elite had been done away. We
need a new generation and have to wait for 5-7-10
years then the problem will disappear. Though
political technologists of Yanukovitch including
Russians decided to gamble with this subject.
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24.
Second – “In case of protest actions would
you take part in demonstrations? Would you take part
in such actions?” 70% of the residents said “No”.
The conclusion: the topic of Russian language could
be exploit and would not join protest actions.
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25.
Ts necessary to say about Putin’s position
in the case of weak President in Ukraine. If
Yanukovitch were the President of Ukraine who was
accused criminally and imprisoned for 4 years then
Putin in the NIS territory would be in a more
favorable position. Weak President of Ukraine and
weak President of Belorus so, all relations of
international structures would be directed first of
all to Putin including the major international
problems.
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26.
At the above situation Putin could have
advantages with a little bit larger authoritarian
means of government, but with Yushchenko as the
President Putin’s position became weaker, because
Yushchenko stands for freedom of speech and
democracy more consistently. He made speech in the
USA Congress, in Bundestag, in the European
Parliament and he is accepted everywhere.
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27.
Besides the “Russian factor” we had the
“factor of Kuchma” and his possible third term as a
President. When Yanukovitch was proposed as a
candidate from the East, from the land of coal
miners we knew that in the West and in the Center of
Ukraine he would not find sufficient support.
Elections are mathematics and the power was in need
to forge more than 4 million votes. They tried to do
it. 10-12% made 3.5 million people. We tried to
understand why did they propose Yanukovitch? In that
scenario Kuchma intended to confront the East and
West and then at the top of confrontation he would
appear to be the only one who reconciled Ukraine as
President of the third term. |
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28.
There were several very dangerous ideas never
came in mind to an ordinary Ukrainian. First, the
idea of a Civil War was propagated by the central
TV-channels. Such posters as “Are you ready to a
Civil War?” were widely spread. Such ideas were made
public during the teledebate between Yushchenko and
Yanukovitch.
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29.
The second idea – in the negative campaign
against Yushchenko the idea of split of Ukraine into
different parts. Then this idea turned into clear
separatism and some regions wanted to separate at
the end of the elections.
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30.
We found a warehouse with such kind of
products (100 tons) and destroyed it but some
portion of this products was distributed and the
power took part in this.
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31.
As to the negative information broadcasted by
the Ukrainian TV-channels in general then the amount
of negative information about Yushchenko was 7 times
more than about Yanukovitch.
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32.
Here is a survey revealing the Ukrainian
mentality. A question: “What would you do if
representatives of power press you and force you to
vote “as it should be?” 57% of residents answered
that they would vote in any case like they wanted,
22% said that they were not going to participate in
the elections. The latter answered in such a way but
it did not mean that they really did not intend to
take part in the elections. Only 15% of residents
said the truth – they were going to vote as they
liked in any case though they made an air they were
obeying. And only 3% claimed that they would vote as
they were ordered. Taking into account that scheme
and censorship as well as mass media campaign
against Yushchenko we could foresee the way the
people were going to vote. We also were aware of
that.
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33.
We knew that in case the power would lose
they could apply extreme measures. It happened. We
were afraid of that but frankly speaking nobody
could believe in it. The bodyguards were dismissed
for 4 hours by the request of the President and he
was poisoned.
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34.
We had three rounds in this campaign to be
more precise two rounds and reelections of the
second round and after the second round the orange
revolution started. In the first round Yushchenko
won o.5% together with falsifications. In the second
round of course after the result had been announced
– 49% and 46%, with the national exit poll results
of 54% and 43%, people understood that they were
deceived and they had to fight for their freedom
themselves so Maidan began and the orange revolution
was initiated.
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35.
We prepared Maidan. We installed a stage with
a screen demonstrating counting of votes, pitched
27 tents from each region for collection of the
protocols. People joined us. That time nobody knew
that 500 thousand people would stay in the street at
150C of frost and defend their choice.
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36.
Key messages also were applied in Maidan.
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37.
The first three days it was frightful because
many divisions of police and special forces were
collected near Kiev. Bloodshed was expected. One of
the first messages was “Nobody can stop freedom” –
that amount of people no special forces could stop.
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38.
The second message – “We are together, there
are a lot of us and we are invincible”. This message
later was transformed into a song which later was
presented at Eurovision competition. After that
people in many regions in Ukraine believed that when
many people join together they could do a lot.
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39.
The Message “Yes! Yushchenko!”
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40.
When some thousand of Yanukovitch’s
supporters were brought to Kiev the message “East
and West together!” appeared.
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41.
Summary |
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42.
The results of this campaign. The third round
of voting – 52% for Yushchenko and 44% for
Yanukovitch. To our mind 7-10% votes were forged at
this campaign. During the first round the
falsification was higher during the third one it was
considerably less but it existed. 20% of the
residents were mislead with different manipulations,
brainwash and so on.
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43.
The negative results of this election
campaign for Ukraine. Ideas of a Civil War were
propagated by the central TV channels. Second ideas
of split of Ukraine were disseminated which after
the campaign were transformed into clear separatism.
After the Donetsk voters understood that they were
loosing they claimed that they could not agree and
they were going to separate and form a new republic.
It was very dangerous. The third result – the theme
of separatism was introduced into the society,
differences in language and integration features in
the regions were aggravated, including approach to
Russia, NATO, EU, the West and so on.
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44.
Positive results. First, the epoch of Kuchma
who personified the criminal power has finished.
Second, Ukrainians felt proud for their country. I
believe that this is the most important. Third,
Ukraine became known in the world as a country where
democracy has won. Further, Ukraine has been
separated from Russia in the international mind.
Ukraine got a status of a partner but not a “junior
brother” in relations with Russia. The
characteristics allowing us to integrate in the
European structures were improved. People got a hope
for better life.
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45.
Very brief because of the lack of time I
tried to tell you about this campaign and
technologies that were applied. This picture was
made in the Ukrainian house in Khreshchatik in Kiev.
It is a large exhibition center. There during the
orange revolution 3 thousand people were sleeping
simply on the marble floor during the night and in
the day they were in Maidan. There was minus 15
outside and inside was much more warmer. This year
we had orange New Year trees. I appreciate your
attention. Thank you!
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